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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal in a criminal case. This Court should vacate the judgment

and sentence for Trafficking in Marijuana because there was insufficient evidence
to show the defendant Brian Ebokosia was in possession of the marijuana or that he
aided and abetted in the possession.
B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts
1.

Pretrial proceedings

Deputy Laura Gutierrez made a traffic stop on December 9, 2017 at about
7:18 p.m. Joseph Severn was driving. Mr. Ebokosia was the sole passenger.

The

vehicle was eventually searched and twenty-five pounds of marijuana was
discovered in the trunk.
marijuana.

R 8. Mr. Ebokosia was charged with trafficking in

The Information charged that he “was knowingly in actual

and/constructive possession of 25 pounds or more of marijuana, a Schedule I non—
narcotic controlled substance, all in violation of I.C. § 37-2732B(1)(C).” R. 22. The
court denied the state’s motion to amend the Information to add an allegation that
Mr. Ebokosia aided and abetted Joseph Severn in the trafficking of marijuana.
89.

Nevertheless, it instructed the jury on accomplice liability. R 79.

R

The jury

found Mr. Ebokosia guilty of trafficking in marijuana but the verdict form did not
require the jury to answer whether it found Mr. Ebokosia was a principal or an
accomplice to the offense.

R 88.

1

2. Rule 29 motions
Mr. Ebokosia moved the court for a judgment of acquittal after the close of
the state’s case.

The court denied the motion. T pg. 261, ln. 4 – pg. 272, ln. 10.

After the guilty verdict, Mr. Ebokosia renewed his motion.
state objected and the court held a hearing. R 114; T pg. 369 - 383.

R 91-101.

The

It took the

matter under advisement and issued a written ruling denying the motion. R 117 –
128.
In the written ruling, the court set forth the facts as follows:
On December 9, 2017, Elmore County Sherriff’s Deputy Laura A. Gutierrez
stopped an eastbound vehicle on Interstate 84 for following another vehicle
too closely. Deputy Gutierrez also observed that the vehicle appeared to be
traveling in a three-vehicle convoy.
After stopping the vehicle, Deputy Gutierrez made contact with the driver
and Defendant, who was a passenger in the front seat. The driver told
Deputy Gutierrez that he was closely following the other vehicle because he
did not have GPS, and that the people in the other two cars would be waiting
for them to catch up at the next highway exit. While speaking with the car’s
occupants, Deputy Gutierrez observed a small clear plastic bag containing a
small amount of a leafy green substance near the vehicle’s center console.
The driver handed Deputy Gutierrez the bag. Defendant told Officer
Gutierrez that he and the driver knew each other from work and they were
travelling to Missouri after sightseeing in a redwood forest in Oregon.
Defendant also admitted that he smoked marijuana while in Oregon.
At Deputy Gutierrez’s request, Deputy Stryker and Trooper Rodean reported
to the scene. The officers searched the vehicle while Defendant and the driver
waited in the police cars due to the cold weather. However, the luggage
found in the car’s backseat contained little to no winter clothing or coats. The
officers also observed that the vehicle contained between four and six air
fresheners, including one in the trunk, as well as boxes of uneaten cooked
chicken. The officers testified that they either did not smell, or only
intermittently smelled, marijuana while they searched the vehicle’s
passenger compartment, but each testifying officer stated that the smell of
marijuana was overwhelming once they opened the divider between the
trunk and the car’s back seat.
2

R 118-119
Officer Gutierrez thought the absence of hiking boots and heavy jackets in
the luggage did not match the sightseeing statements.

T pg. 146, ln. 14-18.

In the trunk, the officers found two large duffle bags and a large black
garbage bag. The bags contained sealed packages of at least 25 pounds of
marijuana. The officer noted that Mr. Severn was “Fidgety. Pacing back and forth
nervously,” while Mr. Ebokosia was “very calm and collected. His demeanor did not
change.” T pg 143, ln. 14-17. T pg. 165, ln. 23-25. The video recording of the
traffic stop also showed Mr. Severn was visibly shaken and upset by the events
while Mr. Ebokosia appeared calm and cooperative. Exhibit 14.
The court found there was sufficient evidence to show that that Mr. Ebokosia
knew there was marijuana in the vehicle, but also observed that “[w]hether the
evidence supported an inference that Defendant had ‘control’ over the marijuana is
less clear.” R 124.

It continued:

There was no evidence presented that Defendant owned or had rented the
car, nor that he possessed any keys that he could use to access the trunk from
outside the car. Defendant was in the front passenger seat, not the driver’s
seat when the vehicle was stopped. Although the bag containing marijuana
residue was found near Defendant, and he admitted to smoking marijuana in
Oregon, there was no evidence that marijuana was found on Defendant’s
person. Further, there was no evidence that the bags or packaging that
housed the marijuana contained anything tying them to Defendant or
indicating that they, or their contents, belonged to him.
R 124-125.
However, the court determined that it did not need to decide whether there
was sufficient evidence to show Mr. Ebokosia had control of the marijuana “because
3

the evidence could have allowed a rational jury to conclude that Defendant aided
and abetted the driver in trafficking marijuana.” R 125.

It reasoned:

The Court concludes that a rational jury could have found that Defendant was
riding in a car that was travelling in a convoy-like formation, that Defendant
knew there was a large amount of marijuana in the vehicle, that Defendant
was familiar with marijuana, and that Defendant knew the driver from work.
Although there is no direct evidence that Defendant purchased the marijuana,
loaded it into the car, or agreed to drive the car, a rational juror could have
inferred that Defendant learned of the plan to transport a large quantity of
marijuana across state lines at some point during the trip, and was not an
innocent bystander, but knowingly encouraged, promoted, or assisted in the
operation.
R 127-128.

Accordingly, the court denied the motion. R 128.

At sentencing, the court imposed the mandatory minimum five-year sentence
with all five years determinate. It also imposed the mandatory $15,000 fine.

R

134.
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed.
III.

R 140.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Is there sufficient evidence that Mr. Ebokosia possessed the marijuana or
aided and abetted someone else’s possession to support the guilty verdict?
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Introduction

A finding of guilt will be overturned on appeal where there is not substantial
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution. State v. Morales, 146 Idaho 264, 266, 192 P.3d 1088, 1090 (Ct.
4

App. 2008).

"Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it

and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven."

State v. Kraly, 164 Idaho 67, 423 P.3d 1019, 1021 (2018), quoting State v. Smith,
161 Idaho 782, 790, 391 P.3d 1252, 1260 (2017) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
Idaho=s substantial evidence rule is similar, but not identical, to the federal
rule, mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment=s due process clause, which requires
the reviewing court to determine Awhether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.@ Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.”).
Here, there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction under either
the Idaho or federal rule.

As explained below, the evidence is not sufficient to

sustain the conviction because there was no evidence presented that Mr. Ebokosia
possessed the marijuana or aided and abetted in its possession.
B.

There is insufficient evidence to prove Mr. Ebokosia was guilty as a
principal.

The jury was instructed that:
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly participates in
the acts constituting a crime and a person who, either before or during its
commission, intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages,
5

counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a crime with
intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both can be found guilty of the
crime. Mere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or
commission of a crime is not sufficient to make one an accomplice.
R 79.

Under this instruction, the state could prevail if it showed either that Mr.

Ebokosia possessed the marijuana or aided and abetted Mr. Severn’s possession.
As an initial matter, Mr. Ebokosia will explain why the state failed to present
sufficient evidence of principal liability.
“Possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or constructive.”

State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 777, 735 P.2d 1087, 1088 (Ct. App. 1987). To prove
constructive possession, a defendant must have, either jointly or exclusively, “both
knowledge and control of the drugs.” Id. A defendant’s “nonexclusive possession of
the premises upon which drugs were found,” without additional evidence from
which individual knowledge and control may be inferred, is inadequate. Id.; see

also State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 754, 554 P.2d 684, 686 (1976) (same); State v.
Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 834, 718 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Ct. App. 1986) (“There must be
substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that establishes the guilt of
each defendant as an individual rather than the collective guilt of two or more
persons.”).

Instead, the state must produce “substantial evidence, either direct or

circumstantial, that establishes the guilt of a defendant as an individual rather
than the collective guilt of two or more persons.” Garza, supra (quotations and
brackets omitted). Joint possession and access to areas containing contraband is
not sufficient without more to establish control. See id.
In Garza, the police found marijuana, paraphernalia, and evidence that
6

marijuana was being sold in three rooms of the home that the defendant shared
with her husband.

Both spouses were found guilty of both possession of

marijuana and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Garza’s conviction because the state
failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that he exercised individual control
over the contraband.

Although it was clear that he was in close proximity to the

drugs, the Court found “[m]ere proximity cannot establish constructive possession.”

Id.
Thus, where a defendant is in non-exclusive possession of the premises upon
which drugs were found there can be no legitimate inference that he knew of the
drugs and had control of them in the absence of other circumstances such as
incriminating statements which tend to support such inference. State v. Warden,
97 Idaho at 754, 554 P.2d at 686.

“There must be substantial evidence, either

direct or circumstantial, that establishes the guilt of [a] defendant as an individual
rather than the collective guilt of two or more persons.” State v. Vinton, 110
Idaho at 834, 718 P.2d at 1272.
In State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 539, 861 P.2d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1993),
officers approached a parked car containing three people, including the defendant,
an 18-year-old backseat passenger.

On the backseat floor, within the defendant’s

reach, the officers found an open case of beer that contained both empty and
unopened beer cans.

A magistrate judge convicted the defendant of underage

possession of alcohol. That conviction was reversed on appeal because while his
7

very close proximity to the beer supported an inference that he knew it was there,
there was insufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could have
concluded that he controlled it; no evidence was admitted showing who owned the
car, who else was in the car, their relationship to the defendant, or that the
defendant smelled of alcohol. Id. at 542, 861 P.2d at 112.
Similarly here, the state did not present evidence sufficient for a rational
trier of fact to conclude based on substantial evidence that Mr. Ebokosia exercised
control and dominion over the marijuana contained in the trunk of the vehicle. All
the evidence shows was that Mr. Ebokosia was a front seat passenger in a vehicle
that contained at least twenty-five pounds of marijuana.

The evidence showed

and the court found that:
It is undisputed that Defendant did not have actual, physical possession of
the marijuana when Deputy Gutierrez stopped the vehicle; there was no
evidence that Defendant had any marijuana on his person or in his hands at
any point during his encounter with Deputy Gutierrez, and other than a few
nuggets of marijuana that were discovered on the car’s floor, and the small
amount of leafy marijuana residue in the plastic bag, there was no evidence
that any marijuana was within Defendant’s immediate reach.
R 120-121
Accordingly, the state had to prove that Mr. Ebokosia constructively
possessed the marijuana.

But, as noted by the district court, there was no evidence

that Mr. Ebokosia owned or rented the car. He did not have access to the trunk, as
he was not in possession of car keys. He was not the driver, but was in the front
passenger seat when the when the vehicle was stopped. No marijuana was found on
his person.

“Further, there was no evidence that the bags or packaging that
8

housed the marijuana contained anything tying them to Defendant or indicating
that they, or their contents, belonged to him.”

R 124-125.

Finally, Mr. Ebokosia’s calm demeanor during the search of the vehicle while
Mr. Severn was fidgeting and pacing nervously, shows it was Mr. Severn’s
marijuana.

Mere presence in a vehicle that contains contraband is insufficient to

establish dominion and control over the contraband and “guilt by association” is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Garza, supra; State v. Maland, supra.
Consequently, this Court should find the evidence is insufficient to prove that Mr.
Ebokosia is guilty of possessing the marijuana as a principal.
C.

There is insufficient evidence to prove Mr. Ebokosia aided and abetted in
the possession of the marijuana.

Even though the court found that there was no direct evidence that
Defendant purchased the marijuana, loaded it into the car, or agreed to drive the
car, it still found there was substantial evidence to support the conviction under
an aiding and abetting theory for the five reasons below.

R 127-128.

In fact,

none of these facts are sufficient either individually or collectively.
1. Mr. Ebokosia “was riding in a car that was traveling in a convoy-like
formation.” (R 127.)
Even taken in the light most favorable to the state, this fact is only
circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ebokosia was aware Mr. Severn was transporting
marijuana.

It is not evidence that he assisted Mr. Severn in any manner.

2. He “knew there was a large amount of marijuana in the vehicle.” (Id.)
The evidence of the convoy-like formation and the lack of trunk space,
9

necessitating the storage of personal luggage in the back seat, is at best some
circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ebokosia was aware of the presence of marijuana
in the trunk.

Again, it does not show that he assisting Mr. Severn in trafficking

the marijuana.
3. That Defendant “was familiar with marijuana.” (Id.)
While Mr. Ebokosia smoked marijuana in Oregon and was aware of the
presence of some shake in the passenger compartment, that does not tend to show
he aided or abetted Mr. Severn in trafficking.
4. Mr. Ebokosia “knew the driver from work.” (Id.)
This is not substantial evidence that Mr. Ebokosia aided or abetted Mr.
Severn in trafficking marijuana. In particular, there is no evidence that his
statement about sightseeing was not true, especially as he never claimed that they
had gone hiking or engaged in any kind of outdoors activity.

Moreover, a

bystander’s mere acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the commission of an offense
is not sufficient to make that person an accomplice. State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892,

804, 655 P.2d 99, 111 (Ct. App. 1982). See also, State v. Adair, 99 Idaho 703, 587
P.2d 1238 (1978).
Thus, the court’s conclusion that “a rational juror could have inferred that
Defendant learned of the plan to transport a large quantity of marijuana across
state lines at some point during the trip, and was not an innocent bystander, but
knowingly encouraged, promoted, or assisted in the operation,” is not supported by
constitutionally sufficient evidence.

Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; U.S. Const. Amend.
10

14; Jackson v. Virginia, supra; In re Winship, supra.
D.

Conclusion

As the state failed to present any evidence that Mr Ebokosia possessed the
marijuana or aided and abetted Mr. Severn in possessing it, the conviction violates
the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. State v. Morales,

supra; Jackson v. Virginia, supra.
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above, Mr. Ebokosia asks the Court to vacate the judgment and
sentence, and order that a judgment of acquittal be entered. See State v. Kraly, 164
Idaho 67, 423 P.3d 1019, 1026 (2018).
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of January, 2019.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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